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Abstract
This paper explores the political economy of resource 
curse with the view of appreciating the development 
challenges caused by crude oil dependency in Nigeria. 
Relying on the systematic analysis of secondary data, 
it posits that Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, a major 
oil producer and one of the leading member of OPEC, 
since the discovery of crude oil, have been awash with 
petrodollar but without sustainable development and 
industrialization. The problem attributed to the challenges 
is the crude oil dependent and rentier economic structure 
of Nigeria, where crude oil surpluses were misappropriated 
by the successive governments. To unravel the dialectics 
of crude oil dependency from a resource curse perspective, 
the paper argues that crude oil discovery and the oil 
boom of the 1970s and 1990s rather than bringing 
about meaningful development, under ‘right-talk’ led 
to a series of agitations and violence in the Niger Delta 
region. To mitigate the challenges of resource curse 
arising from crude oil dependency in Nigeria, the paper 
pragmatically recommends the diversification of the 
economy, transparency and accountability in government, 
the establishment of sovereign welfare fund and the 
restructuring of federalism. 
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INTRODUCTION
Crude oil is central to the global industrial development. 
The importance of crude oil has always been at the centre 
of any discussion of geopolitics by the superpower states 
which are major consumers of the crude oil. Nigeria 
is naturally endowed with abundant natural resources, 
especially crude oil deposit, which is critical to the 
understanding of the trajectory of development question 
and the challenges facing the country. The discovery of 
crude oil in the late 1950s and the boom that followed 
in the early 1970s and 1990s marked a watershed in the 
quest for Nigeria’s industrialisation and development 
to become a major player in the international political 
economy system. After several decades, Nigeria is still 
struggling with developmental challenges. Nigeria 
presently has over 170 million people; it is Africa’s 
major oil producer and one of the largest economies 
of the black continent, and an active member of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries since 
1971 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2010), but without 
substantial evidence of a sustained form of development 
(Odukoya, 2006).
One phenomenon that has been of serious concern 
to many crude oil producing countries is the challenges 
associated with whether the discovery of crude oil is 
a blessing or a curse. Although, this is not probable in 
Europe and America, but in less developed countries, 
particularly in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle-East the situation proves to be a curse rather 
than a blessing. In this part of the world, evidence 
abounds that conflict of various complexities that have 
turned violent have been monstrous, destroying lives and 
properties and setting off political systems to be unstable 
and in most circumstances, dysfunctional. The situation 
point to the paradox of plenty that does not only affect 
negative economic growth, but also intergroup relations 
in the global south, which the implication has been poor 
developmental outcomes.
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 The poor development conditions in Nigeria are 
crystal clear that the endowment of natural resources, 
whether discovered, exploited or deposited is not a 
necessary precondition for a country to attain a certain 
level of development. Central to the development is the 
attitudinal content and the commitment of the people, 
both horizontally and vertically, in the country that drives 
development. Unfortunately, these moral requisites are 
to a large extent absent or inadequate in most countries 
in the global south. In Africa, for example, this informs 
the reason why the discovery of new resources, instead 
of bringing about multi-sector linkages, usually leads to 
the negligence of other sectors of the economy (Collier, 
2007; Sachs & Warner, 1995). In Nigeria, the discovery of 
crude oil led to the negligence of the agricultural sector, 
which serviced the process that led to the discovery and 
survival of the crude oil economy. Not only that, the over 
dependence of the country on the crude oil production 
has also undermined the growth and development of 
other sectors of the economy. Countries in Asia and 
partly in Latin America proportionately developed based 
on developing internal dynamics of positive attitude 
and commitment to the ideas of development by linking 
the various sectors of the economy, both modern and 
traditional alike to respond to the international dynamics 
of political economic relations (Auty, 1993; Di John, 
2016; Collier, 2008).
The implications of structural dependency defined by 
the inability of developing a linkage-driven economy in 
a country, especially in the global south are enormous. 
The enormity of the challenges in contemporary times for 
countries depending on the crude oil economy, especially 
in Africa takes the form of capital flight, corruption, 
conflicts and political instability in the struggles among 
different disenchanted groups to benefits from the wealth 
accruing from the natural resources (Auty, 2004; Di John, 
2011; Collier, 2007; Sachs & Warner, 1995). Hence, 
Nigeria, in contrast, has been branded a poor and corrupt 
country, despite the huge petrodollar that is on daily 
basis realized from the exportation of crude oil worth 
not less than 2 million barrels per day since early 2000 
(OPEC, 2012; Stiglitz, 2007; BBC, 2008). Therefore, this 
is central to the development challenges of Nigeria after 
over six decades of crude oil exploration.
According to Dudley Seers (1969) to assess the 
level of development in any country, three questions are 
fundamental, which relates to poverty, unemployment 
and inequality level. A critical look at Nigeria shows that 
none of these major development challenges have been 
addressed. Evidence abounds that Nigeria’s unemployment 
rate stands at 12.8%, inflation rate at 13.7%, and the 
poverty rate at 62% and, on the indices of human well-
being, Nigeria is rated 142 out of 149 countries. These 
indicate that the incidence of development challenges 
(UNDP, 2016; HDR, 2010; CBN, 2010; NBS, 2012). It is in 
this context that this paper attempts an examination of the 
resource curse to understand why development remained 
elusive in Nigeria after six decades as a leading crude oil 
producer and exporter in Africa. 
1 .  C R U D E  O I L  D E P E N D E N C Y, 
RESOURCE CURSE AND THE RETIER 
STATE
The debate over crude oil dependency and the continuous 
dialectics of resource curse still remain alive in the 
parlance of political science. This is because there is 
a synergy between the crude oil dependency, resource 
curse and rentier with countervailing effects on the states 
that possess crude oil resources. Crude oil dependency 
reflects a situation of non-diversification of the economy 
through multi-sector linkages, but constitutes a holistic 
commitment to the discovered crude oil as the major 
source of income generation and financing the affairs of 
the country. This character of dependency in resource 
abundance countries in the Middle-East and North and 
West Africa such as Pakistan, Libya, and Nigeria among 
others, manifest in a way that rent is collected and used to 
achieve certain objectives (Yates, 1996; Ross, 2001).
In countries where this is evident, it is because of the 
availability of natural resources, and there is always the 
tendency of triggering conflicting relations (Ross, 2004). 
The tendency is the fact that the state depends on rent. 
Rent seeking implies a situation where countries derive a 
large fraction of their revenues from external rents, who 
exploit their internal resources (Krueger, 1974; Drazen, 
2002). According to Yates (1996), rentier is a system of 
relationship which stems from the collection of rents, 
the excess value or surplus, left over after the cost of 
production had been met and paid to the owners of the 
land for the use of its natural resources. Rent seeking 
countries are usually accompanied by poor economic 
governance (Ross, 1999, 2001; Rosser, 2006), which has 
the tendency of leading to mismanagement, smuggling, 
black marketeering, corruption, predatory and patron-
client practices that have the tendencies of dissenting the 
country into conflicts and instability arising from wealth 
distribution (Krueger, 1974). This is because rent does 
not only structure the nature and character of the national 
economy, but also structure the pattern of interaction and 
functionality of the state and its institutions.
The manner in which crude oil wealth is distributed 
in rentier state weakens the state capacity and aggravates 
divisive consciousness and tendencies of transforming 
the groups into insurgents, who also take advantage of the 
resources to fund their rebellion against the state. In this 
context, what obtains is that the state is in a flux due to 
weakening economic capacity as a result of the conflict 
arising from competing for social forces in demand for 
a share of the national cake (Kendhammer, 2015). This 
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becomes the curse of natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 
2001; Rosser, 2006), and the consequences of resource 
abundance that tends to generate negative developmental 
outcomes, including poor economic performance, growth 
collapse, and high levels of corruption, ineffective 
governance and greater political violence, especially 
in developing countries (Di John, 2007). In other 
words, this presents a situation of “paradox of plenty” 
where resources are not effectively used to engender 
development in the country (Karl, 1997). 
The implications are enormous to include indices 
of extreme dependence on wealth for fiscal revenues, 
export sales, or both; low saving rates; poor growth 
performance; and high volatile resource revenues (Auty, 
1993). In developing countries where this situation 
is prevalent, natural resource is deemed to be more a 
“curse” than a “blessing” (Ross, 2006, 2008; Di John, 
2011; Ross, 2001, 2006). Although the resource curse 
thesis has been criticized on the ground that resources 
enhance the development capacity (Obi, 2010, p.489), 
it reveals how the transnational social forces and 
power relations in collaboration with the indigenous 
bourgeoisie within the arena of globalised capitalism 
and industrial power contribute in fuelling the conflicts 
arising from resource abundance in developing countries 
(Ferguson, 2005; Obi, 2010).
2 .  T O W A R D  T H E O R E T I C A L 
ORIENTATION: THE POST-COLONIAL 
STATE THEORY
The post-colonial state theory provides the spectacle 
to investigate the political and economic dynamics of 
resource curse and the dialectics of crude oil dependency 
in Nigeria. The post-colonial state theory is not a single 
coherent body of thought, but a collection of perspectives 
from scholars with neo-Marxist orientation. Some of the 
scholars that provided the basis for the post-colonial state 
theory consist of radical Marxists such as Hamza Alavi, 
Collin Leys, John Saul, Claude Ake, Samir Amin, and 
Gunnar Myrdal (Ugwu & Okoli, 2014, p.182). These 
scholars studied the colonized states to understand and 
ascertain their role in the socioeconomic and political 
development. In their respective arguments, the state 
occupies the locus of politics and driver of development. 
Therefore, the actions and inactions of the state toward 
the various competing social forces determine the level of 
internal stability or conflicting relations.
In the discourse on the nature and character of the 
state, Ake (1985) asserts that the political structures of the 
post-colonial state is overdeveloped but has a low level 
of development in terms of productive forces. Because 
of the low-level development of productive forces, the 
approach of the state to development is viewed from 
the state-centric perspective, which creates the Web of 
prebendal and patrimonial relationships. The post-colonial 
state has a direct bearing on the politics of exclusion in 
which certain individuals and groups tend to be excluded 
and become disenchanted with the state (Richard, 1987). 
In this context, the political elites in the effort to break 
open the social, political and economic spaces, aggravates 
disruptive centrifugal identity questions to destabilize 
the political order (Nwosu, 2000). The manifestations 
of these disruptive tendencies come about as a result of 
competition for the control of resources, particularly in a 
situation where resources are in acute scarcity. The control 
of state power provides the privileges of determining 
“who gets what, when and how” (Barongo, 1980; Ugwu 
& Okoli, 2014), therefore becomes a factor in conflict and 
indeed, violence.
Accordingly, Alavi argued that the problem with 
the post-colonial state stems from the fact that it is not 
established by an ascendant native bourgeois but by 
the foreign capitalist bourgeoisie, and because of this 
situation, the post-colonial state present a complex 
interdependence and interrelations, which tend to make 
the state to be autonomous from the society (Ugwu & 
Okoli, 2014). It creates the condition for competing 
interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie and the landed class relationships with the 
state, at the same time acting on their behalf to preserve 
social order in which their interests are paramount. In a 
nutshell, the manifest dynamics of the post-colonial state 
are a reflection of colonial imperialism that produced the 
major and complex processes in the specific political, 
economic and social matrix of post-colonial relations 
(Gutkind & Wallerstein, 1976). 
The failure to develop an effective indigenous 
capitalist class to extract and process internally natural and 
material resources in the post-colonial state is arguable 
because of the heavy dependence on the externalities of 
the development driven economic system. In the post-
colonial state, for the political class to sustain themselves 
in power, they depend on the internal strings of informal 
relations, whether ethnic and or religious and the external 
webs of both informal and formal relations to shut out 
other groups disenchanted with the distributive capacity 
of the state. The disenchanted groups resort to alternative 
options to situate their grievances taking advantage of 
the resource abundance in their regions to deny the state 
the required loyalty and to request for expanded political, 
social and economic spaces for inclusion in the state. At 
some point, they even demand a change in the regime 
otherwise they choose to move out of the federation due to 
perceived inequality and demean condition of livelihood. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the post-colonial 
state theory appropriates the realities in African states 
and indeed, Nigeria, where resource abundance has given 
rise to the emergence of disenchantments in the effort to 
control resources.
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3.  NIGERIA ECONOMY AND CRUDE OIL 
DEVELOPMENT
Nigeria is a post-colonial state with a long history of 
economic prosperity. The origin of the rent-seeking 
economy and crude oil sector development in Nigeria 
dates to the colonial era. However, it is important to state 
that before colonialism in Nigeria, there has been varied 
indigenous economic systems serving bio-social relations 
at the level of the family, community and the society. The 
social relations of production were traditionally based 
and dependent on farming, hunting, trade and exchange 
by barter. During this period, in most parts of Nigeria, 
the bourgeois class that could lead to the exploitation 
of relationships was undeveloped until the period 
between 15th and 19th century when the local slave trade 
developed.
The political economy relation was transformed to 
meet new ends during the colonial era. The production 
relations changed from production to satisfy bio-social 
relations of production for exportation. Cash crops such 
as cocoa, cotton, groundnut and rubber in commercial 
quantities were produced and exported to the detriment of 
indigenous economies. Also, laws in the administration of 
tax were promulgated, labour became for sale, marketing 
boards were set up and the slave trade became a big 
business. Because of colonial activities, agriculture 
contributed to more than 70 percent of Nigeria’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Nwozor, 2010). Through 
the indirect rule system, the Royal Niger Company and 
British colonial administration set up policies to benefit 
from the exploitation of the people and alienation of 
Nigeria’s wealth which was mainly agriculture driven. 
This era lasted from 1860 to 1960. Nigeria’s major 
specialization was the production and export of raw 
materials and importation of finished goods from Britain 
and other parts of Europe. The discovery of crude oil 
at Oloibiri in January 1956, the old Rivers state (now, 
Bayelsa State) in the Niger Delta region (see Figure 1), 
and the attainment of independence on 1 October 1960, 
marked the beginning of rent-seeking economy and crude 
oil dependence in Nigeria (Amune, 2013). 
Figure 1
Constituent States of the Niger Delta, Nigeria 
Source: Idemudia, U, & Ite, U. E. (2006, p.195).
However, the search for crude oil by the colonial 
government mineral survey corporation dates to 1903. 
A German company Bitumen also made the attempt 
without much success in 1907. A subsequent search was 
hindered as a result of the First World War. In 1937 Anglo-
Dutch Shell D’arcy explored for crude oil in Nigeria. The 
outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the search. 
By 1947 Shell D’arcy came back as Shell-BP Petroleum 
Development Company, which in 1958 resulted in a 
breakthrough in the discovery and production of crude oil 
in commercial quantities (Nwozor, 2010; Shel, 2005). The 
daily production capacity of crude oil in 1958 was 5,100 
barrels per day, and in 1965 crude oil production rose to 1.68 
million barrels (Amune, 2013; Okonta & Oronto, 2003).
It suffices to state that what brought this transformation 
was the decision by the government in 1960 to give 
exploration rights to other foreign companies for onshore 
and offshore crude oil businesses. In 1971 crude oil 
production capacity rose to 558.9 million barrels. This 
coincided with the period Nigeria became a member 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). In 1977 the government created the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company (NNPC) as a state-owned 
company to control the production of crude oil by the 
upstream and downstream sectors (Odularu, 2008; 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2008; Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 2008; Amune, 2013). In the operations 
and performance of the crude oil sector through joint 
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ventures and partnership between NNPC and oil majors, 
the Shell-BP has the largest joint venture. Shell-BP alone 
produces 50 % of Nigeria’s crude oil, while ENI/Agip, 
Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Total, and Texaco put together 
to share 50% of Nigeria’s crude oil production (Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation 2008; Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2008; Odularu, 2008). 
The military incursion in politics consequently made 
crude oil the major foreign earnings for the country. Under 
the military, the control of crude oil and its revenue became 
centralized unlike during the first republic when regional 
governments were to a greater extent independent of the 
control of the central government. With the centralization 
of the government, the military distributed crude oil 
resources arbitrarily and primitively accumulated wealth for 
themselves. Although exploration had started in the Niger 
Delta region and a refinery was already in place in Port-
Harcourt as in 1965 before the civil war, other refineries 
were constructed subsequently by the military government. 
These refineries included those of Warri, Kaduna and 
second refinery in Port-Harcourt. They were constructed 
to satisfy domestic fuel needs of the country. See table 1 
for the list of the refineries, year of establishment and their 
respective capacities. 
Table 1
Refineries, Year Established and Refining Capacity in Nigeria
S/No Refineries Year established Refining capacity
1. Port-Harcourt Refinery 1965 35,000 bpd (later upgraded to 60,000 bpd)
2. Warri Refinery 1978 100,000 bpd (upgraded in 1986 to 125,000 bpd)
3. Kaduna Refinery 1989 100,000 bpd (expanded in 1986 to 110,000)
4. Second Port-Harcourt Refinery 1989 150,000 bpd to supply both domestic needs and to export the surplus
Source: NNPC, 2004; SHELL, 2005; Odularu, 2008.
Since the discovery and exploration of crude oil in 
Nigeria, successive governments took advantage of the 
opportunity provided by the petrol economy to execute 
projects that in most circumstances were unrealized. 
The programmes of the government were reflected 
in the several development plans, which included the 
Nigeria’s First Development Plan (1962-68), Nigeria’s 
Second Development Plan (1970-75), Nigeria’s Third 
Development Plan (1975-80), and the Nigeria’s Fourth 
Development Plan (1981-85). Subsequent national 
development plans under different nomenclatures that 
were made included the Green Revolution, Operation Feed 
the Nation, Vision 2010, 7Points Agenda, New Economic 
Empowerment Strategy (NEEDS), and Vision 20:2020 
(Sunusi, 2010; CBN, 2008). Between 1960 and 2008, the 
percentage of revenue generated from both crude oil and 
non-crude oil sector of the economy was enormous, but 
with little to show in terms of development. See table 2 
for detail of percentage of oil revenue in Nigeria between 
1960 and 2008 presented in millions of Naira.
Table 2
Percentage of Oil Revenue in Nigeria, 1960-2008 (Million Naira, NM) 
Year Total revenue Oil revenue Non-oil revenue % of revenue
1960 223.65 0.00 223.65 0
1965 654.34 0.00 654.34 0
1970 634.00 166.00 467.40 26.1
1975 5,514.70 4,271.50 1,243.20 77.4
1980 15,223.50 12,353.30 2,880.20 81.1
1985 15.050.40 10,923.70 4,126.70 72.5
1990 98.102.40 71,887.10 26,215.30 73.2
1995 459,987.30 324,547.60 135,439.70 70.5
2000 1,906,159.70 1,591,675.80 314,483.90 83.5
2005 5,547,500.00 4,762,400.00 785,100.00 85.8
2006 5,965,101.90 5,287,566.90 677.535.00 88.6
2007 5,715,600.00 4,462,910.00 1,200.800.00 78.0
2008 7,868,590.10 6,530,630.10 1,335,960.00 82.9
Source: CBN Annual Statistical Bulletin, December 2008 in Luqman & Lawal, 2011.
The priority areas of the government during this 
period were reconstruction after the civil war, industrial 
and agricultural development, building of hydroelectric 
power dams and Ajaokuta steel industry, reduction of 
the unemployment rate, indigenization policy, increase 
national income, balanced development, and self-
reliance and harnessing of national resources for the 
benefit of the citizenry. In a nutshell, these plans were 
geared at the provision of social services, constructions 
of infrastructures, bringing about industrialization and 
Political Economy of Resource Curse and 
Dialectics of Crude Oil Dependency in Nigeria
38Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
developing and nurturing an enduring democracy. The quantum of export of crude oil in percentage from 1963 to 2006 
is presented in Table 3.
Table 3
Petroleum Exports as Percentage of Total National Exports
Year 1963 1965 1970 1975 1981 1991 2000 2006
Percentage 11 26 58 93 97 97 99 98
Source: Mahler, 2010. 
It reveals that by now Nigeria supposed to have 
industrialized, with high level of human development 
index, reduction in poverty ratio and with a sustained 
means of livelihood for the majority of Nigerians. 
Unfortunately, the situation is different, situations are 
worsening every day. From the foregoing Tables 2 and 
3, it is evident that Nigeria has accrued foreign earnings 
worth over one trillion dollars from crude oil export 
since the 1970s; the standard of living has remained 
deplorable.
The situation has worsened in recent times, following 
current economic recessing due to reliance on the crude oil 
as a major source of Nigeria’s export. The poverty level in 
Nigeria has been alarming. In 1980 the poverty level was 
27.2%. It rose to 65.6% in 1996. The rate of increase in 
poverty was about 141.2%. In absolute terms, the poverty 
rate rose from 67 million in 1996 to 68.7 million in 2004. 
The proportion of poverty rate among urban and rural 
poor was about 40% and 60% respectively. Poverty rate 
reached a higher level in 2010 where 70% of the Nigeria 
population lives under $1 per day, and no less than 92% 
of the population live under $2 per day (Aigbakon, 2008; 
Ucha, 2010; CIA World Book, 2011).
Some of the major reasons for the situation in Nigeria 
are structural conditions, such as the persistence of 
stagnation, inadequate inter-sector linkages, rural spatial 
structures, inequality in economic capacity, and frequent 
political instability as some of the challenges. The 
other challenges include the character of the Nigerian 
state which includes political clienteles, unnecessary 
spending by government, power tussle and widespread 
corruption in and outside government necessitated by 
the national cake syndrome, and above all, the lack 
of commitment to implement development plans. 
No wonder most of Nigeria’s mineral resources have 
remained untapped. 
4 .  R E N T  S E E K I N G  E C O N O M Y, 
RESOURCE CURSE AND DIALECTICS 
OF CRUDE OIL DEPENDENCY
The major cause of Nigeria’s crude oil dependency is 
the phenomenon of the “Dutch disease” which set in 
during the period of the crude oil boom in the 1970s, to 
the neglect of other sectors of the economy. With crude 
oil boom exchange rates increased due to the inflow of 
foreign earnings as a result of crude oil resource export. 
This migrated labour and capital from other productive 
sectors of the economy and affected the domestic 
production of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors 
of the economy. It also affected their competitiveness 
against the crude oil export. Since the discovery of crude 
oil, even though agriculture has remained the only sector 
that absorbs about 70% of the labour force in Nigeria, 
and the industrial and service sectors absorb only 10% 
and 20% of labour force respectively. The use of the 
vast arable lands for agricultural production, although 
the dominant source of employment, it contributes to 
about 30% to the Gross Domestic Product, while crude 
oil exports contribute 95% of the revenues accruing to 
Nigeria (CIA World Book, 2011, Beblawi, 1990, p.87). 
As a characteristic of rentier state, corruption and 
webs of political patronages developed, both within 
and outside the country, the crude oil resources became 
the basis for debt accumulation. Niger Delta region, 
where the Nigeria’s crude oil is exploited, increasingly 
became prone to conflicts as a result of environmental 
pollution caused by the multinational corporations. The 
military regime was blamed for creating the enabling 
environment, which the MNCs in the region used to 
destroy the environment. The government was not 
concerned about the condition of the people of the 
Niger Delta. Rather, it continues to sustain the culture 
of corruption, violence, repression and the lack of due 
process in the governance and management of the crude 
oil wealth. This generated disenchantment among the 
people of the Niger Delta region who felt shut out of the 
Nigeria political arithmetic, despite the environmental 
destruction caused by MNCs on which from ancestry 
depends their livelihood. 
In the region, Adaka Boro was the first to lead a 
rebellion against Nigeria seeking autonomy of the region, 
unfortunately, the rebellion was crushed effectively by 
the national government. Subsequently, Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and his other kinsmen executed in 1995 had agitated 
against the government under the Ogoni bill of rights 
(Agbo & Lenshie, 2010). This situation changed with the 
political landscape between Niger Delta, MNCs and the 
federal government to that of violent confrontation. The 
military government in 1978 had carried out a reform 
in the land use decree to secede the entire lands in the 
country to the federal government. The government 
became the new landlords, which contravened the 
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traditional land rights in Nigeria (Ifesinachi & Aniche, 
2014).
In this context, the military used the decree to 
distribute crude oil rich lands in the Niger Delta to 
themselves and accolades, both within and outside the 
country. The General Ibrahim Babangida and General 
Sani Abacha regimes were indicted the most for the 
deplorable environmental condition in the Niger Delta 
region. They make use of the agitations of the Niger 
Delta people, which started peacefully and turned it in 
a matter of politics to generate identity crises to further 
deepen the North-South divides (Agbo & Lenshie, 
2010). While this was going on, they were looting public 
fund generated maximally from the sales of crude oil. 
During this period, over 12.2 billion US dollar crude oil 
revenue disappeared during the Babangida era and over 3 
billion US dollars was personally looted by General Sani 
Abacha. The situation also became sustained under civil 
rule. Because of the level corruption, it was difficult to 
differentiate between civilian and military (Jega, 2007; 
Bakare, 2016). 
Between 1970 and 1999 the Nigerian petroleum 
industry generated about 231 billion US dollars in terms of 
revenue. If the money was distributed, every Nigerian was 
going to earn 1,900 US dollars each. During this period, 
Nigeria’s real income per capita fell from 264 US dollars 
to 250 US dollars per year, with poverty caused partly by 
the decades of poor governance, which due to corruption 
drained over 380 billion US dollar in terms of resources 
from the Nigerian population. In 2007, Nigeria’s budget 
was 19.5 billion US dollars, of which only 5.4% was spent 
on health and 8.2% on education (Oxfam, 2009, p.22). 
These critical sectors were undermined among others in 
Nigeria. Also, annual subsidy payment was N151.9 billion 
in 2006, N188 Billion in 2007, N256.3 billion between 
January and July 2008, N421.5 billion in 2009 and N673 
billion in 2010. The subsidy payment in 2011 suddenly 
spiked to N1.3 trillion, which was later revised upward to 
N2.19 trillion, amounting to 225.4% increase in one year 
(Bakare, 2016). 
These explain some of the reasons the Niger Delta 
people resort to militancy to push their grievances against 
the Nigerian government (Obi, 2007). Some of the 
agitated groups included the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Forces (NDDVF), Niger 
Delta Vigilante (NDV) and Movement for the Manic 
Patria of the Niger Delta (MMND). Other powerful groups 
include Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND), Movement for the Sovereignty of Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) (Ukiwo, 2007; Onuoha, 2008; Amune, 
2013), and recently the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). 
These groups have sought for redress and reparation for 
environmental pollution, benefits from the petrodollars 
known as “national cake” as well as resource control 
(Odukoya, 2006; Obi & Rustad, 2011; Osaghae, 2015). 
The activities of these groups have led to kidnappings, 
killing and destruction of crude oil pipelines and crude 
oil bunkering (Watts, 2007), while government engages 
them violently, and often dialogues, to end the restiveness 
in the region (Ikelegbe, 2006; Watts, 2007). Since the 
agitations of the Niger Delta became intense, Nigeria has 
recorded serious losses in terms of the quantity of crude 
oil production in barrels per day measurable in US dollar 
value. See Table 4 and Table 5 for detail.
Table 4
Quantity of Crude Oil Loss in Barrels Per Day/Amount in US Dollars for 2006 (Based on the Exchange Rate of 175)
Month Estimated qty of barrels of oil loss per day
Total barrels of oil
 loss for the month
OPEC basket price for 
bonny light crude oil for the 
month in US$
Total amount loss for 
the month in US$
January 700,000 21,700,000 64.04 1,389,668,000
February 700,000 20,300,000 62.12 1,261,036,000
March 700,000 21,700,000 63.80 1,384,460,000
April 700,000 21,700,000 71.80 1,507,800,000
May 700,000 21,700,000 71.75 1,556,975,000
June 700,000 21,700,000 70.22 1,474,620,000
July 700,000 21,700,000 75.49 1,638,133,000
August 700,000 21,700,000 75.29 1,633,793,000
September 700,000 21,700,000 63.87 1,341,270,000
October 700,000 21,700,000 58.57 1,270,969,000
November 700,000 21,700,000 60.32 1,266,720,000
December 700,000 21,700,000 64.28 1,394,876,000
Grand Total $17,120,320,000
Source: Ajaero, 2009, p.19.
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Table 5
Quantity of Crude Oil Loss in Barrels Per Day/Amount in US Dollars for 2008 (Based on the Exchange Rate of 175)
Month Estimated qty of barrels of oil loss per day
Total barrels of oil 
loss for the month
OPEC basket price for 
bonny light crude oil for the 
month in US$
Total amount loss for 
the month in US$
January 700,000 21,700,000 88.5 1,917,195,000
February 700,000 20,300,000 90.64 1,839,992,000
March 700,000 21,700,000 99.03 2,148,951,000
April 700,000 21,700,000 105.16 2,208,360,000
May 700,000 21,700,000 119.39 2,590,763,000
June 700,000 21,700,000 128.33 2,694,930,000
July 700,000 21,700,000 131.22 2,847,474,000
August 700,000 21,700,000 112.41 1,633,793,000
September 700,000 21,700,000 96.85 2,439,297,000
Grand total $20,720,842,000
Source: Ajaero, 2009, p.19.
The activities of the militant in the Niger Delta have 
had direct implications for Nigeria’s economy as a 
result, crude oil dependency as a major source of foreign 
earnings, depicting that the country is not only rentier 
state but a country suffering from the resource curse. The 
role of the state in Nigeria’s divided society has been 
challenged by disenchanted social forces in the Niger 
Delta due to poverty and other human security challenges 
(Onuoha, 2008), and the Igbo people in South-East 
Nigeria, particularly with President Goodluck Johnathan’s 
failure to retain the presidency in the 2015 presidential 
election. Before this period, particularly between January 
2002 and January 2014, the crude oil production has been 
on the increase (see figure 2). 
Figure 2: OPEC 12 Crude Oil Production Capacity 
(IEA)
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Figure 2
OPEC 12 Crude Oil Production Capacity (IEA)
Source: IEA Monthly data, November 2014.
With relative stability in the Niger Delta region 
following the Late President Yar’adua administration’s 
amnesty programme and the stable crude oil price in 
the international market enabled successive Nigeria’s 
government to experience democratic progress. The 
inflation rate, though fluctuating in 2007 there was a fall in 
Mohammed Isa; Nsemba Edward Lenshie (2017). 
International Business and Management, 14(3), 33-44
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the rate but rose steadily and became all-time low between 
2013 and 2014 and started rising in 2015 reaching its peak 
in October 2016 (see Figure 3), a period less than one year 
into President Muhammadu Buhari administration. The 
reasons for the decline in crude oil production in Nigeria are 
necessitated by two factors. The first is an internal factor, 
which is associated with the activities of the Niger Delta 
Avengers that has been losing 800,000 barrels per day 
since Buhari’s ascension of the presidency. The crude oil 
output has been on reduction to 1.4 million bpd, the lowest 
in 22 years (see Figure 4), causing a dwindling economic 
progress in Nigeria (Editorial, ThisDay Newspaper, 2016). 
Figure 3
Nigeria’s Inflation Rate, 2007-2016
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016.
Figure 4
Nigeria Crude Oil Production, January 2016-October 2016
Source: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2016.
In January 2016 the crude oil production capacity 
experienced steady growth. The growth rate steadily 
experienced a decline in April and reached a free-fall 
in June 2016. This was a result of the activities of the 
militant groups in the Niger Delta over non-responsiveness 
of the government to the aspiration of the people to fix 
the means of livelihood in the region. In October 2016, 
production rate has been on the increase, but epileptic due 
to the adverse resilience of the militant groups, making 
Nigeria fall behind Angola which now tops the lists of 
crude oil producing countries in Africa. The Nigeria’s 
rentier situation is compounded by the fall in the value of 
the Nigeria Naira since independence (Editorial, ThisDay 
Newspaper, 2016). The second factor is associated with 
the crude oil price fall in the international market, and 
indeed, the global economy meltdown contributed to 
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the current challenges Nigeria is facing in contemporary 
times. There is the likelihood that if the Niger Delta 
hostility continues, the Buhari administration will look 
toward the Niger Republic to import crude oil for refining 
to respond to the domestic need for fuel in Northern 
Nigeria.
The implication of turning to the Niger Republic for 
crude oil supply is that there will be a huge capital flight 
into the Nigerien economy and undermine  development 
in Nigeria. This situation point to the fact that Nigeria is a 
dependent economy, rent seeking from the crude oil sector 
is its major source of revenue. According to World Bank 
(1990), rent seeking countries depend largely on crude oil 
to the tune of 35%. Beblawi and Luciani (1987) put it at 
40 percent. In the case of Nigeria, crude oil dependency 
is over 75%, which present it as higher rent-seeking 
(Beblawi, 1990; Oxfam, 2009; CBN, 2010; Mahdavy, 
1970). In Nigeria, crude oil dependency and distributive 
inequality reinforce perceptions of relative deprivation, 
especially among crude oil producing communities (Jega, 
2000, p.28), with incessant conflicts as the effects of the 
resource curse.
CONCLUSION
In this study, the paper examined the political economy 
of resource curse with the view of appreciating the 
development challenges caused by crude oil dependency 
in Nigeria’s rentier economy. The rent-seeking economies 
depending on the crude oil as the basis for generating 
foreign earnings for financing the affairs of their country 
do face challenges arising from the resource curse. In 
Nigeria, the resource curse challenges arise from the 
distributive politics of the revenue accruing from the 
surpluses of the crude oil exportation. The inequality 
in the distribution of the crude oil wealth has generated 
agitations, particularly the Niger Delta militants with 
damages on the crude oil infrastructures and rendering 
production marginal. The other challenges faced by 
Nigeria has been the overbearing influence of the military 
and civil regimes in the control and management of crude 
oil resources and surpluses, which is widely held serve 
the interest of the political class as against the people, 
especially the Niger Delta people whose environment 
has been rendered deplorable as a result of crude oil 
exploration.
In this respect, the attitude manifested by the military 
and civil government alike, have been characterized 
by corruption, nepotism and patrimonial character 
in the distribution of extractive licenses, primitive 
accumulation in collaboration with both internal and 
external collaborators among others, have continued to 
undermine the capacity of the state to deliver dividends of 
governance to generating disenchantment from dissident 
groups from the Niger Delta region. In recent times, the 
activities of militants in the region have led to the fall in 
revenue generation and indeed distribution. This situation 
is the implication of rent-seeking economy and the Dutch 
disease called the “resource curse”. To come out of these 
challenges there is the need for the diversification of the 
economy, transparency and accountability in government, 
good governance by being responsive to the demands of 
the citizenry, restructuring federalism to reflect the internal 
dynamics of the Nigeria societies, and the development 
of sovereign welfare fund to meet headlong the enormity 
of challenges facing the Nigerian people, especially in the 
Niger Delta region that has posed challenges to effective 
exploration of crude oil on which the Nigerian economy is 
dependent.
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